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Book Review
Free Speech and the Assumption
of Rationality
SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SocIETY. By Franklyn S. Haiman. Chi-
cago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1981. Pp. x, 499. $22.50.
Reviewed by Frederick Schauer*
Thirty years ago legal scholars might not have considered im-
possible the task of writing a book that discussed virtually all as-
pects of the first amendment.' The theory underlying the first
amendment was restricted largely to the standard platitudes about
the marketplace of ideas," and legal and constitutional doctrine
was equally narrow in focus. With defamation, commercial speech,
obscenity, abusive language, and the like kept safely away from the
coverage of the first amendment, courts and commentators had
little with which to concern themselves except the extent to which
communists and others of that ilk presented the kinds of dangers
that might override free speech considerations.4
Today, however, legal scholars confront a much more compli-
cated interpretation of the first amendment. Not only has the Su-
preme Court broadened the scope of the first amendment to cover
* Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. A.B., 1967, M.B.A., 1968,
Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Harvard University.
1. See, e.g., Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941).
2. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
IBEW, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950); J. MMTON, AREOPAGITICA (J.
Suffolk ed. 1968).
3. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 253, 266 (1952) (excludes "libelous
utterances" from "the area of constitutionally protected free speech"); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (excludes commercial speech from first amendment
protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (excludes lewd, ob-
scene, and profane language from first amendment protection); Attorney General v. Book
Named "God's Little Acre," 326 Mass. 281, 285, 93 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1950) (excludes obscene
speech from first amendment protection).
4. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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a wide range of speech previously interpreted to be untouched by
first amendment considerations, 5 but courts and commentators
also have added numerous doctrinal tools to deal with special set-
tings and particular state interests.6 First amendment doctrine is
now both broad and complex, and the task of writing about all of it
seems at least forbidding and perhaps impossible. Unthwarted by
the magnitude of the mission, however, Franklyn Haiman has at-
tempted, in Speech and Law in a Free Society,7 to survey and to
integrate almost every area in which the first amendment restricts
or should restrict the powers of the states and the federal
government.
Haiman's book is in some ways reminiscent of Thomas Emer-
son's The System of Freedom of Expression." Like Emerson,
Haiman devotes only a relatively brief introductory portion of his
book to laying the philosophical foundations for a theory of free
speech and establishing the doctrinal structure for making first
amendment determinations." He then devotes the bulk of the book
to demonstrating the results that this approach would yield when
applied to the full range of first amendment issues.10 Also like
Emerson, Haiman presents a very speech-protective view of the
5. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-73 (1976) (commercial speech is protected by the first amendment);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523-28 (1972) ("opprobrious" and "abusive" language, as
distinguished from "fighting words," is protected by. the first amendment); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ("a state cannot under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments award damages to a public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves 'actual malice' "); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Al-
though Roth and its progeny have continued to treat obscenity as outside the coverage of
the first amendment, see Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEo. L.J. 899 (1979), the
standards for determination of obscenity now make that determination a constitutional
question in a way that it was not prior to Roth.
6. See e.g., New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982) (child pornography); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (zoning for speech within the first amend-
ment); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (broadcasting not given full
first amendment protection); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (public em-
ployees); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1;
Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.
L. REV. 685 (1978). The foregoing sample of special rules, principles, and doctrines that have
emerged in relatively recent times does not purport to be even close to exhaustive.
7. F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAw IN A FREE SOCIETY (1981).
8. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
9. Id. at 3-20; F. HAiMAN, supra note 7, at 3-15.
10. Although this Review does not deal with the issues, Haiman's willingness to con-
sider such issues as "The Government as Communicator" and "Facilitation of Citizen Ex-




first amendment, indeed one substantially more speech-protective
than Emerson's. Further comparisons with Emerson's work, how-
ever, are not fruitful, and Haiman's book fully deserves to be eval-
uated in its own right.
Haiman devotes little space to fundamental free speech princi-
ples, either from a philosophical or an historical perspective.
Rather, he directs his efforts toward an in depth treatment of dis-
tinct doctrinal areas. Haiman's treatment of these first amendment
categories is lucid, and the depth and breadth of his research and
documentation are quite impressive. Even apart from Haiman's
thought-provoking argument, the book is valuable for its accurate
and well-documented surveys of the major domains of first amend-
ment doctrine; each discussion is replete with references to both
the case law and academic commentary.
As one might expect in a work of this breadth, however, the
treatment of legal doctrine is better in some parts of the book than
in others. Haiman's treatment of offensive speech, intimidation
and coercion, invasion of privacy, government secrecy, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress are particularly noteworthy
for their comprehensiveness and insightful analysis."' Indeed,
Haiman's exploration of the first amendment issues raised by the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is especially use-
ful because the free speech implications of this well-established
tort generally have been ignored.
12
In other areas, however, Haiman's treatment of legal doctrine
contains noticeable gaps. The discussion of symbolic speech," for
example, contains no mention of an approach whereby the Court
looks to the government's purpose in regulating the speech to eval-
uate the constitutionality of that regulation."' Of course, the in-
sights of Justice Harlan and Professors Ely and Tribe in urging
that approach may be incorrect, but the approach is too important
to be ignored in a supposedly comprehensive work.1 5 Similarly,
11. F. HmAN, supra note 7, at 61-86, 131-241.
12. Id. at 148-56. This is a general area of particular expertise for Haiman. See
Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153
(1972).
13. F. HAImAN, supra note 7, at 25-40.
14. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); see also L. TRME, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 580-601
(1978).
15. Haiman's own approach to this issue seems singularly unpersuasive. By looking
primarily at the amount of harm involved, F. HMwAN, supra note 7, at 35, he seems unfairly
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Haiman's treatment of obscenity does not mention the doctrinal
structure of the existing "nonspeech" approach., Again that ap-
proach may be faulty, but in a comprehensive study obscenity may
not be dealt with by concentrating on arguments, such as those of
Walter Berns1" and Harry Clor,15 that bear little resemblance to
current constitutional doctrine."'
In addition to gaps of this type, Haiman makes occasional er-
rors in his description of legal doctrine. For example, the conclu-
sion that "reckless disregard of the truth" in the law of defamation
is only a difference in degree from negligence 20 is simply a mis-
statement.2 1 This error seems to flow from Haiman's occasional
willingness to look only to the ordinary literal meaning of the
words in a legal standard, rather than to a technical meaning of
the words that can be gleaned only from the standard's elaboration
and application in other cases.2 2 Another example is Haiman's con-
clusion that the "incitement" element of Brandenburg v. Ohio23 re-
fers either to effect or to undisclosed mental intent 2 when in fact
the technical meaning of "incitement" is relatively settled under
the first amendment to require, in all but the most extreme cases,
specific words of incitement recognizable as such on the face of the
speaker's statement.
25
I do not wish to suggest by these criticisms that Haiman's
to disable society from dealing with people who may wish intentionally to violate laws
against minor harms, such as littering, to make some point. See Schauer, Categories and the
First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. Rav. 265, 279 n.67 (1981). His trust in
the courts to make delicate determinations in this area seems at odds with a distrust of
judicial determinations that pervades much of the rest of the book.
16. F. HAIN, supra note 7, at 164-81. For a description of the "nonspeech" ap-
proach, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
17. See W. BwRs, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FuTuRE OF AMERIcAN DEMOCRACY
(1976).
18. See H. CLOR, OBSCNITY AND PUBLIC MoRALITY (1969).
19. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
20. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 57-58.
21. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-33 (1968), clearly requires that a defen-
dant have specific doubts about the truth of the defamatory material to be held liable. The
St. Amant standard is certainly more than merely an extreme form of negligence. Id. at 731.
22. See G. GorTEB, THE LOGIC OF CHOICE (1968); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961); Stone, Ratiocination Not Rationalisation, 74 MIND 463 (1965); see also E. Lvi, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).
23. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
24. F. HAMAN, supra note 7, at 276-83.
25. See Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. Rv. 719, 754-55 (1975).
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book is characterized by error. On the contrary, the presentation of
constitutional doctrine is for the most part accurate and insightful,
and the presentation of an argument supported by so much careful
research and documentation is refreshing. I mention the occasional
technical gaps and errors primarily to underscore the fact that this
book is most valuable for what it plainly is: an argument for a spe-
cific and extreme vision of the first amendment. Haiman presents
his discussion of doctrine not for reference purposes, but to sup-
port his argument; and from that perspective one cannot fault his
treatment of doctrine. The book gives the reader an accurate gen-
eral picture of contemporary first amendment doctrine, a picture
more than adequate to enable the reader to understand Haiman's
arguments for restructuring that doctrine.
Because Haiman's book is primarily an argument, the most
appropriate way to evaluate that argument would seem to be in
terms of its major themes rather than its details. Nevertheless,
mentioning some of Haiman's more specific recommendations will
make the major themes appear more clearly. For example, he advo-
cates a major restructuring of the law of defamation, limiting re-
covery for civil damages to those cases in which a publisher is un-
willing to grant the opportunity to reply.26 When a publisher is
willing to permit a reply, the defamed individual is without other
recourse, regardless of the falsity of the material, the harm caused
by that falsity, the status of the plaintiff, or the motive with which
the defendant published the false statement.Y Similarly, Haiman
would eliminate almost entirely remedies for invasion of privacy.
He suggests that such remedies should remain only for those in-
stances in which a defendant breaches a promise of confidentiality
or commits a commercial or noncommercial "theft" of informa-
tion.28 Haiman also advocates virtually complete elimination of the
notion of incitement, finding even the Brandenburg standard in-
sufficiently speech-protective. 29 He also would eliminate control
over all but intentional misrepresentations even in the commercial
26. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 43-60.
27. Id. Haiman argues that Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974), probably does not bar his proposed remedy, because the defamer has a choice among
retraction, publication of a reply, or contesting a suit for damages. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7,
at 49. But such a choice might be impermissible if the consequences are to require relin-
quishment of one constitutional right in order to protect another. See Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
28. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 61-86, 426. Haiman includes eavesdropping in the
category of commercial and noncommercial "theft" of information. Id.
29. Id. at 276-77, 427.
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speech context.30 Furthermore, Haiman would provide a constitu-
tionally based right of access to government secrets,3 1 he would
eliminate entirely the law of conspiracy,3 2 and he would eliminate
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 As these
recommendations suggest, Haiman, a fortiori, disagrees with pre-
vailing doctrine in areas such as obscenity, offensive speech, and
nonverbal communication. 4
Haiman constructs these specific recommendations by apply-
ing a number of pervasive premises that he sets out both in the
introductory section of the book and in its conclusion. These
premises include a strong commitment to individual liberty as an
end in itself, a belief in the marketplace of ideas, a faith in the
ability of people to decide what is in their own best interests, and a
substantial distrust in the ability of government to make determi-
nations of the truth, value, or harm of communication. Although
Haiman seems correct in asserting that these premises are "very
much in the mainstream of this country's political-philosophical
tradition,"3 " that assertion, even if true, does not make the prem-
ises empirically sound or philosophically valid.3 8 Moreover, these
premises alone are insufficient to justify the substantial modifica-
tions in first amendment doctrine that Haiman advocates. For this
step he must rely on what is probably the most central of his
premises, the premise that:
[t]he human condition is not predetermined. Individuals, within the lim-
its of their intellectual and emotional development, their physical environ-
ment, and the restraints which may be imposed on them by other persons,
are capable of free choice and are responsible for the behavior which they
choose. The philosophy of free speech presumes the existence of the freedom
to accept or reject the alternatives which are offered. Communication which
does not allow for this autonomous decision making violates the integrity of
those to whom it is addressed and thus does injury to them.39
30. Id. at 196-203.
31. Id. at 382-88, 428-29.
32. Id. at 288-94.
33. Id. at 148-56.
34. Id. at 19-40, 157-81.
35. Id. at 6-7, 425-26.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6. A book such as Haiman's, however, would seem the ideal place to consider
whether some aspects of "this country's political-philosophical tradition" might not be
wrong.
38. Haiman acknowledges that he presents his premises as assertions with which the
reader may very well disagree. Id. at 6. Much of what follows is my response to his implicit
invitation to evaluate these premises.
39. Id. at 6-7.
[Vol. 36:199204
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Unless deprived of free choice by deception, physical coercion, or an impair-
ment of normal capacities, individuals in a free society are responsible for
their own behavior. They are not objects which can be triggered into action
by symbolic stimuli but human beings who decide how they will respond to
the communication they see and hear.4
0
Once we realize the full import of this premise, many of
Haiman's conclusions follow naturally. The harm done by defama-
tion is not primarily the fault of the defamer, but of those who
draw conclusions based on incomplete information. The violent
acts of a crowd stirred to action by an impassioned speaker are not
the responsibility of the inciter, but of those who have chosen to
act on the speaker's words. A person who acts on misleading com-
mercial information has himself to blame for not checking further,
and the person who is offended by someone swearing on a streetcar
should look not to the swearer but to his own "cultural blinders"
that prevent him from realizing that the swearer has done nothing
more than utter a series of noises.41
In reaching these conclusions, Haiman thus relies on a broad
assumption of rationality, with consequent responsibility, on the
part of the population at large. If we assume this degree of ration-
ality, then Haiman's conclusions follow. Yet one must ask whether
we are justified in making that assumption.
Initially, we might wish to accept the assumption of rationality
because it is true. Although assumptions are only assumptions, one
reason for making them is the substantial but unverified possibility
that they may be empirically correct. Although Haiman does not
attempt to demonstrate the factual basis for his assumption of ra-
tionality, if that assumption is correct then we should take his rec-
ommendations very seriously.
Unfortunately for Haiman's argument, most of the areas of
law that he would eliminate exist precisely because the assumption
he makes has seemed throughout history to be empirically false.
Incitement always has been considered a crime42 because people
are influenced to action in passionate moments by persuasive
speakers. Defamation is a tort precisely because people believe
what others tell them, even if full investigation might show the al-
legations to be false. Similarly, commercial misrepresentation is a
tort because most people take at face value the labels they find on
products. These and other examples compel the conclusion that
40. Id. at 425-26 (emphasis in original).
41. Id. at 22.
42. See G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 161-62 (1971).
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much of the law is based on an assumption diametrically opposed
to Haiman's - an assumption that people are not always perfectly
rational, that they are inclined to act on incomplete information,
that the shortness of life often requires reliance on the statements
of others, and that people often are swayed by passion as much as
by reason.
The possibility exists of course that the common law is empiri-
cally wrong in its assumptions and that Haiman's assumption of
rationality is truer to the facts, but that possibility seems unlikely.
A sociological, anthropological, or historical treatise is not neces-
sary to show that people quite often are unwilling or unable to lis-
ten to reason, and equally unwilling or unable to suspend judg-
ment until all available information and opinion have been
received. The dreams of the Enlightenment have not proved to be
an accurate portrait of the behavior of the population, and history
is studded with examples of the triumph of factual falsehoods and
unsound ideas. 43  Although governmental authorities rejected
Galileo's ideas, the absence of that governmental power in analo-
gous cases has not ensured the triumph of scientific truth. As re-
cent events have shown, for example, the lack of governmental
suppression of Darwinism has not guaranteed its acceptance by the
population at large, and indeed a resurgence of anti-Darwinism is
taking place that in no way can be explained by censorship."
I do not mean to suggest by these comments that censorship
by government is a generally preferable method of arriving at
truth. The people, for all their flaws, probably are more reliable
than the actions of an often self-interested government.45 This
claim, however, is much more modest than an assumption of uni-
versal rationality. Moreover, it is plainly insufficient to generate a
principle of free speech that will prevent the state from acting to
sanction or to deter those utterances that common experience has
43. See F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-34 (1982). Skepticism
about the validity of the marketplace model seems to be increasing. See Baker, Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1978); Kendall, The "Open
Society" and its Fallacies, 54 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 972 (1960); Richards, Free Speech and
Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45
(1974).
44. See P. KITCHER, ABUSING SCIENCE: THE CASE AGAINST CREATIONISM (1982); Bird,
Freedom from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School Instruction and Religious
School Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 125 (1979); Symposium, Creationism, 68
ACADEME 6 (1982).
45. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 521; see also F. SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 80-86.
206 [Vol. 36:199
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shown to cause the very harms that governments traditionally have
been trusted to prevent. Thus, Haiman's assumption of rationality
is unproved at best and more likely it is simply false.
A close look at Haiman's assumption of rationality, however,
reveals that it is not so much a factual assumption as a normative
philosophical premise. He couches his assumption of rationality
much less in terms of empirical observation than in terms of re-
sponsibility. Thus, Haiman's argument is that, in most cases, if A
by his words induces B to act illegally, then society should hold B
and not A responsible."' Similarly, if written or spoken words in-
duce A to act to his own detriment, then A should be responsible
for his own folly in not investigating further.47
From this perspective Haiman can base his argument on a
theory of responsibility without relying on a tenuous assumption of
existing rationality in an empirical sense. The first amendment
thus becomes aspirational rather than empirical in character, with
rationality representing an ideal and not an existing state of af-
fairs. Yet even though rationality at first appears to be a worthy
ideal, we must look a bit closer at Haiman's ideals.
Implicit in Haiman's view of listener responsibility is a lack of
speaker responsibility, but lack of responsibility for what one says
or prints does not seem quite such a worthy ideal. Strong reasons
exist in many areas for holding that governmental intervention to
impose speaker responsibility is likely to produce more harms than
benefits, but this proposition is not the same as saying that speak-
ers ought not to be responsible in a nonlegal sense for the conse-
quences of their utterances. Speaking quite simply is not purely a
self-regarding activity. 4" Although some people speak only because
they like the sound of their own words, the vast majority of speech
is calculated to be heard by others and to affect them.4" Thus, the
argument that society cannot hold speakers responsible for un-
pleasant consequences even though it holds people responsible for
virtually every other form of human conduct seems presumptively
anomalous. 50
To Haiman the "glaring inconsistency" is between our reliance
on the marketplace of ideas for establishing the truth of religious
46. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 277-78.
47. Id. at 205.
48. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 43, at 10-12; Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Ex-
pression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 204 (1972).
49. See, e.g., J. BENN ET, LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR (1976); D. LEWIS, CONVENTION (1969).
50. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 43; Scanlon, supra note 48.
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or political propositions and our unwillingness to rely on that same
marketplace for propositions about a person's reputation. 1 Yet an
inconsistency also exists between our willingness to accept govern-
mental regulation of a wide range of individual conduct and our
unwillingness to accept this regulation in the case of speech. This
inconsistency is explainable by reference to the particular inability
of government, or, more accurately, governors, to make determina-
tions about certain classes of propositions, especially political or
religious propositions. No reason seems to exist, however, to ex-
plain why government is noticeably more inept than the market-
place of ideas in determining the truth or falsity of factual proposi-
tions, and in fact it most likely is not more inept. Thus, no "glaring
inconsistency" exists in the assertion that government or the
courts should intervene to protect against harm except in those
cases in which courts or government are likely to do so with partic-
ular inability, bias, or inefficiency, as in the case of political or reli-
gious propositions.
Not only are there good philosophical reasons for the imposi-
tion of responsibility on people for their harmful acts, including
their verbal acts, but good reasons also exist for not passing all of
the responsibility on to the listeners. Language is the primary
means by which a group of people become a society rather than a
collection of isolated individuals, and language can function in this
way only if people rely on the statements of others and are justi-
fied in that reliance. Without some degree of reliance, people
scarcely can communicate or cooperate with each other. Language
is public property, and there are strong reasons for encouraging
people to rely on at least the factual assertions of others. 2 A
healthy skepticism is important, but rampant skepticism of every
assertion made by anyone seems hardly comprehensible.
The differences between Haiman's and my views of the first
amendment arise from our fundamentally different perceptions of
the function that language performs in society. To Haiman, lan-
guage's symbolic nature makes it significantly different from other
forms of conduct. To the extent that man reacts to symbols, his
reactions are different in kind from his reactions to physical con-
duct.5 3 Although Haiman offers some qualifications, he is willing to
accept as a broad premise the notion that "[s]ticks and stones may
51. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 49.
52. See P. JONES, PHILOSOPHY AND THE NOVEL 183-84 (1975).
53. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 20-21.
[Vol. 36:199
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break my bones, but names will never hurt me." 4
This notion is quite simply untrue. Names often do hurt peo-
ple, and they do so because a person's knowledge of the language is
part and parcel of our existence. Haiman chides Chafee55 for hav-
ing "cultural blinders" in equating swearing on a streetcar with
smoking on a streetcar. 6 Yet Chafee more likely was exhibiting
cultural insight.57 A person's reaction to symbols is as much a part
of him as his reaction to many other stimuli, and to say that
"words and pictures per se do not do injury"'58 is to define people
as purely biological organisms and not as thinking creatures whose
culture and language are as much a part of them as their arms and
legs.5 9 Not only is language as a force a phenomenon that we
should not try to eliminate, but it is also a phenomenon that we
could not eliminate even if we tried.
If Haiman's assumption of rationality is incorrect as a factual
premise and confused as a normative ideal, however, how does one
account for the fact that the first amendment is still in the Consti-
tution? Have the founding fathers required us to accept the as-
sumption of rationality, like it or not? Fortunately, there are plau-
sible explanations for an independent principle of freedom of
speech other than the assumption of rationality. The concept of
freedom of speech is explicable in terms of the dangers of govern-
mental control of certain kinds of speech,60 and these explanations
do not require the unrealistic assumptions about human nature
that Haiman would have us adopt. This Review is not the place to
discuss those alternative explanations, because my point is only
that the mere existence of the first amendment does not compel
Haiman's explanation. As a result, Haiman must rely on either the
54. Id. at 21. Cf. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106
(1979) ("Speech often hurts. It can offend, injure reputation, fan prejudice or passion, and
ignite the world").
55. See supra note 1.
56. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 22.
57. That knowledge of a language is a window to knowledge of a society is a prevalent
theme in modern philosophy. See, e.g., J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (3d ed., J. Urm-
son & G. Warnock eds. 1979); S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? (1969); L.
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1958).
58. F. HAIMAN, supra note 7, at 20.
59. See supra authorities cited in note 54.
60. See BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Blasi, supra note 44; Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Kalven,
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
1983]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
philosophical validity of his normative argument or the empirical
soundness of his factual argument. Neither succeeds, and in this
sense many of Haiman's recommendations fail for lack of sound
premises.
The fact that Haiman forces the reader to think about issues
such as those here discussed makes his book immensely valuable. I
disagree with his premises and many of his conclusions, but he
forces the reader to think about free speech in a way that more
cautious books would not. By spelling out in detail the conclusions
that follow from his premises, Haiman presents the deepest philo-
sophical questions about freedom of speech in a way that is much
more effective than merely repeating the standard arguments with-
out exploring their implications. Haiman's extreme version of the
first amendment will force almost every reader to confront the
most difficult questions of free speech theory, and that effect alone
is more than enough to guarantee the book an important place in
the literature of the first amendment.
[Vol. 36:199
